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PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES
PURSUANT TO FINAL, TEMPORARY, AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS
UNDER CODE SECS. 707 AND 752

By
Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway and Maximilian Pakaluk2
Ernst & Young, LLP, Washington, D.C.
2017
I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

On October 5, 2016, Treasury published final, temporary, and proposed
regulations under Code Sees. 707 and 752 (collectively, the "2016 Regulations"), 3
which consist of four basic parts:
1.

Final regulations under Code Sec. 707 maldng certain modifications to,
and clarifications of, the disguised sale rules, mainly relating to the
treatment of qualified liabilities and reimbursable capital expenditures.

2.

Temporary regulations under Code Sec. 752 disregarding "bottom dollar
payment obligations."

3.

Proposed regulations under Code Sec. 752 broadening the application of
anti-abuse rules in determining "economic risk ofloss" for partnership
liabilities.

4.

A temporary regulation revising the allocation ofliabilities for purposes of
the Code Sec. 707 disguised sale regulations.

B.

The major topic of this outline is the allocation of partnership liabilities. This
issue is relevant to determining a partner's basis in its partnership interest. It is
also relevant to determining the treatment of liabilities for purposes of the
disguised sale rules. Both of these issues bear on whether a transaction can be
done without causing a partner to recognize gain.

C.

The recently issued 2016 Regulations fundamentally change (or propose to
change) the treatment of liabilities both for purposes of the disguised sale rules
and generally under Code Sec. 752.

2
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T.D. 9787 and 9788 and REG 122855-15, published in the Federal Register on October 5, 2016.

II.

D.

Practitioners and taxpayers will need to adapt to this new regime, which no longer
permits what previously constituted standard tax planning techniques for certain
transactions and situations.

E.

Part II of this outline summarizes the temporary and proposed regulations under
Code Sec. 752.

F.

Part III of this outline summarizes the temporary regulations under Code Sec. 707
regarding the allocation of liabilities for purposes of the disguised sale rules. This
outline does not address the modifications to, and clarifications of, the disguised
sale rules, mainly relating to the treatment of qualified liabilities and reimbursable
capital expenditures, made pursuant to the fmal regulations under Code Sec. 707.

TEMPORARY AND PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER CODE SEC. 752
A.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.

For over two decades, taxpayers have relied on a set of rules governing the
allocation of partnership liabilities among partners. These rules provided
clarity and were both administrable and flexible.

2.

The newly issued Code Sec. 752 regulations, in many cases, make it
impossible for taxpayers to allocate liabilities with any degree of certainty.
In addition, especially with respect to the proposed regulations, they
would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for taxpayers to
transfer. property subject to debt in excess of basis to a partnership without
triggering gain at the time of the transfer or subsequently.

3.

The Code Sec. 752 regulations that were issued in the 1990s (as amended,
but for the 2016 Regulations, the "Existing Regulations") embraced the
view expressed by the American Law Institute in its landmark, twovolume 1984 study of subchapter K issues and proposals. In that study, the
American Law Institute stated:
Once it is decided to apply relatively strict rules to profit-and-loss
allocations ... there seem to be no important policies serveq by a
strict rule for allocating liabilities among partners in computing
their basis for their partnership interests. This is particularly true
when there appears to be more than one justifiable allocation with
no single one being clearly conect. 4
The Code Sec. 704(b) regulations provide strict rules for allocating profits
and losses.

4American

Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on Taxation ofPartners, at 264

(1984).

2

4.

It is widely understood that the original motivation for changing the Code
Sec. 752 regulations was to limit taxpayers' ability to structure a leveraged
partnership transaction. Those transactions attempted to comply with the
debt-financed distribution exception to the partnership disguised sale rules
under Code Sec. 707. 5 As discussed in part III, the recently issued final
regulations under Code Sec. 707 address this concern effectively.

5.

Temporary Code Sec. 752 Regulations:

6.

a.

The temporary Code Sec. 752 regulations provide that a "bottom
dollar payment obligation" ("BDPO") that historically created a
recourse liability to the obligor will no longer increase the
obligated partner's share of partnership liabilities. The Treasury's
justification is that such obligations generally lack a significant
non-tax commercial business purpose. 6

b.

The temporary regulations provide for a seven-year transition
period during which some BDPOs may still be taken into account
under the existing partnership recourse debt allocation rules.

c.

BDPOs are admittedly not "commercial," but they addressed a
policy flaw in the prior regulations that often required taxpayers to
enter into BDPOs in order to achieve inoffensive allocations of
liabilities that should have been permitted under those regulations.

Proposed Code Sec. 752 Regulations:
a.

The proposed Code Sec. 752 Regulations set forth a nonexclusive
list of factors that will be considered in determining whether there
exists a plan to circumvent or avoid a payment obligation. The
proposed regulations will apply prospectively from the date they
are published in final form.

b.

The proposed regulations would impose subjective-and in many
cases noncommercial-requirements that practitioners must
consider in order to conclude that any partnership liability is
properly treated as a recourse liability under Code Sec. 752.

5

Amy S. Elliott, Treaswy Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules, 2014 TNT 38-4 (Mar. 3, 2014)
(quoting Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury tax legislative counsel, as saying "When we were considering changes in the Code
Sec. 752 rules related to [the debt-financed distribution] exception, we determined that certain principles that were
being applied for just Code Sec. 707 purposes ought to apply equally in non-disguised sale cases").
6

See the Preamble ofthe Temporary Regulations.
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c.

7.

B.

They proposed regulations would create an un-administrable
regime and would shift allocations of debt away from partners who
bear real economic risk for the debt to those who do not bear any
economic exposure.

Executive Order 13789 and Subsequent Developments:
a.

In Executive Order 13789,7 the Secretary of the Treasury was
directed to immediately review all significant tax regulations
issued on or after January 1, 2016, and submit a report identifying
regulations that (i) impose an undue fmancial burden on U.S.
taxpayers; (ii) add undue complexity to the Federal tax laws; or
(iii) exceed the statutory authority of the IRS.

b.

The IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2017-38, 8 identifying
regulations as either imposing an undue fmancial burden on
taxpayers or adding undue complexity to the Code, and the Notice
included the temporary Section 752 regulations on BDPOs.

c.

On October 2, 2017, the Treasury issued the "Second Report to the
President on Identifying and Reducing Tax Regulatory Burdens."
This report indicates that the Treasury believes the BDPO
regulations should be retained and that the Treasury does not plan
to propose substantial changes to the regulations.

ALLOCATION OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES: GENERAL RULES
1.

Background
a.

Since at least 1956, the theory underlying the regulations
goveming the allocation of partnership liabilities has been that
liabilities should be allocated to partners who would be required to
pay the liability if the partnership were unable to do so because
those partners are considered to bear the economic burden for the
liability.

b.

If a lender would have no recourse to any partner if the pattnership
were unable to repay the liability, only partnership profits could
satisfy the liability. Accordingly, the regulations have allocated

7

82 Fed. Reg. 19317 (Apr. 21, 2017).

8

2017-30 I.R.B. 147.
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partnership nonrecourse liabilities among the partners in the same
way the partnership's profits would be allocated among them. 9
2.

Recourse Liabilities
a.

A partnership liability is a recourse liability to the extent that any
partner or related person bears the "economic risk of loss" for that
liability. 10 In general, recourse liabilities are allocated to the
partner who would be responsible for paying them if the
partnership were unable to.

b.

To determine who bears the economic risk of loss for a recourse
liability, the regulations employ a "constructive liquidation" test.
Reg. § 1. 752-2(b)(1) provides that upon a constructive liquidation,
all of the following events are deemed to occur simultaneously:
1.
11.

With the exception of property contributed to secure a
partnership liability, all of the partnership's assets,
including cash, have a value of zero.

111.

The partnership disposes of all of its property in a fully
taxable transaction for no consideration (except relief from
liabilities for which the creditor's right to repayment is
limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership).

IV.

All items of income, gain, loss or deduction are allocated
among the partners.

v.
c.

All of the partnership's liabilities become payable in full.

The partnership liquidates.

A partner bears the economic risk of loss for a liability to the
extent that, if the partnership constructively liquidated, the partner
(or a related person) would be obligated to either pay a creditor or
make a contribution to the partnership because the liability would
. be due and the partner (or related person) would not be entitled to
reimbursement. 11

9See

American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on Taxation ofPartners, at 264
(1984).
10

Reg. §1.752-l(a) (1).

11 Reg. § 1.752-2(b). In addition, a partner bears the economic risk ofloss for a liability to the extent the partner (or a
related person) makes (or acquires an interest in) a nonrecourse loan to the partnership and the economic risk ofloss
for the liability is not borne by another partner. Reg. § 1.752-2(c).

5

d.

In circumstances where a pminer is entitled to reimbursement, the
economic risk of loss is shifted to the obligor under such
reimbursement ~nangement. Reg. §1.752-2(b)(3) provides that all
statutory and contractual obligations relating to the partnership
liability are taken into account for purposes of determining which
pminer bears the risk of loss, including contractuai obligations
outside the partnership agreement such as
guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement agreements
and other obligations running directly to creditors or to
other pminers, or to the partnership;

1.

12

11.

obligations to the pminership that are imposed by the
partnership agreement, including the obligation to make a
capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account
upon liquidation of the partnership; and

111.

payment obligations (whether in the form of direct
remittances to another partner or a contribution to the
patinership) in1posed by state law, including the governing
state partnership statute.

e.

Accordingly, an obligation to make a contribution to a partnership
pursuant to a capital account deficit restoration obligation ("DRO")
is generally taken into account as an obligation of a patiner under
the regulations, subject to the new rule for BDPOs.

f.

For purposes of detennining the extent to which a partner or
related person has a payment obligation and bears the economic
risk of loss for a recourse liability, it is assumed that all partners
and related persons actually perform on their obligations,
inespective of their net worth, unless the facts and circumstances
indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation. 12

g.

A patiner's or related person's obligation to make a payment may
be disregarded or treated as an obligation of another person. This
can occur if the facts and circumstances indicate that a principal
purpose of the anangement between the parties is to (1) eliminate
the pminer's economic risk of loss with respect to the obligation or
(2) create the appearance that the partner or related person bears
the economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the
anangement is othe1wise. 13

Reg. §1.752-2(b)(6); Reg. §1.752-2(j) (3).

l3Reg. §1.752-2(j)(l).
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3.

Nonrecourse Liabilities
a.

A partnership liability is a nonrecourse liability if no partner or
related person bears the economic risk of loss for that liability.

b.

Under Reg. §1.752-3(a), a partner's share of partnership
nonrecourse liabilities equals the sum of three tiers of allocations.
1.

First, a partner is allocated an amount of a partnership's
nonrecourse liabilities equal to the amount of that partner's
share of partnership minimum gain determined under Code
Sec. 704(b). 14
a)

ii.

Second, a partner is allocated an amount of a partnership's
nonrecourse liabilities equal to the amount of any taxable
gain that would be allocated to the partner under Code Sec.
704(c) (or in the same manner as under Code Sec. 704(c) if
partnership property is revalued), if the partnership
disposed of all partnership property subject to nonrecourse
liabilities for no consideration other than full satisfaction of
the liabilities. 15
a)

111.

The partnership minimum gain is generally the
excess of the amount of a nonrecourse liability over
the Code Sec. 704(b) book value of the property
securing the liability.

The second tier amount is often referred to as "Code
Sec. 704(c) minimum gain."

Third, a partner's share of the amount of nonrecourse
liabilities that is not allocated to partners under the first or
second tiers ("excess nonrecourse liabilities") is detetmined
in accordance with the partner's share of partnership
profits.
a)

The partner's interest in partnership profits is
determined by taking into account all facts and
circumstances regarding the partners' economic
arrangement.

b)

The partnership agreement may specify the
partner's interest in partnership profits for purposes

14

Reg. §1.752-3(a)(l).

15

Reg. § 1.752-3(a) (2).

7

of allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities provided
the interest so specified is reasonably consistent
with allocations (that have substantial economic
effect under the Code Sec. 704(b) regulations) of
some significant item of partnership income or gain.

1v.

c)

Alternatively, excess nonrecourse liabilities may be
allocated among the pminers in accordance with the
manner in which it is reasonably expected that the
deductions attributable to those nonrecourse
liabilities will be allocated.

d)

Additionally, the partnership may first allocate
excess nonrecourse liabilities to a partner up to the
amount of built-in gain that is allocable to the
partner on Code Sec. 704(c) property or property
for which reverse Code Sec. 704(c) allocations are
applicable by virtue of a book-up (as described in
Reg. §1.704-3(a)(6)(i)) where such property is
subject to the nonrecourse liability to the extent that
such built-in gain exceeds the amount of gain taken
into account under the Reg. §1.752-3(a)(2) with
respect to such prope1iy (this last allocation method,
the "Additional Method"). 16

The Additional Method was added to Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3)
by regulations issued on October 31, 2000. The preamble to
the regulations proposing the Additional Method explained
the change as follows:
Under section 73l(a), a pminer will recognize gain
on the distribution of money by the partnership to
the extent that the distribution exceeds the pminer's
adjusted basis in its partnership interest. Section
704(c) generally ensures that any built-in gain on
contributed prope1iy will be recognized by the
contributing pminer upon the disposition of the
property by the partnership. The partnership
liability allocation rules arguably should not
accelerate the contributing partner's recognition of

16

In the Final Regulations under Code Sec. 707 adopted as part of the regulations discussed herein, the following
language was added to the end of Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3) addressing disguised sale transactions: "The significant item
method, alternative method, and additional method do not apply for purposes of §1.707-5(a)(2). To the extent that a
partnership uses this additional method and the entire amount of the excess nomecourse liability is not allocated to
the contributing pmtner, the partnership must allocate the remaining amount of the excess nomecourse liability
under one of the other methods in this paragraph (a)(3)."

8

that gain when the amount of the partnership's
liability attributable to such property is sufficient,
allocated to the contributing partner, to prevent
such partner from recognizing gain.

if

In response to comments received, the proposed
regulations modify the third tier to allow a
partnership to allocate the portion of a nonrecourse
liabilities in excess of the portions allocated in tiers
one and two (excess nonrecourse liabilities) based
on the excess section 704(c) gain attributable to the
property securing the liability. Thus, to the extent a
portion of a partnership nonrecourse liability is ·
available to be allocated in the third tier, the
partnership may allocate that portion to the
contributing partner based on the excess section
704(c) gain inherent in the property. 17 [Emphasis
added.]
v.

C.

TEMPORARY CODE SEC. 752 REGULATIONS
1.

BPDOs
a.

The temporary regulations provide that in determining whether a
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability,
any BDPO will not be recognized. Specifically, Temporary Reg.
§ 1. 752-2T(b )(3)(ii)(C)(l) sets forth the following definition of a
BDPO:
1.

17

Notwithstanding the intended effect of that amendment to
the regulations, the regulations still had certain
shortcomings in achieving this identified goal, and
taxpayers have used BDPOs to remedy these shortcomings
in ways that appear consistent with the intent of the
Existing Regulations.

With respect to a guarantee or similar arrangement, any
payment obligation other than one in which the partner or
related person is or would be liable up to the full amount of
such partner's or related person's payment obligation if,
and to the extent that, any amount of the. partnership
liability is not otherwise satisfied.

The preamble to the notice of proposed rulemaking, 65 FR 2084 (Jan. 13, 2000).

9

11.

With respect to an indemnity or similar arrangement, any
payment obligation other than one in which the partner or
related person is or would be liable up to the full amount of
such partner's or related person's payment obligation, if,
and to the extent that, any amount of the indemnitee's or
benefited party's payment obligation that is recognized
under this paragraph (b)(3) is satisfied.

111.

An anangement with respect to a partnership liability that
uses tiered pa1tnerships, intermediaries, senior and
subordinate liabilities, or similar anangements to convert
what would otherwise be a single liability into multiple
liabilities if, based on the facts and circumstances, the
liabilities were incuned pursuant to a comn1on .plan, as pmt
of a single transaction or anangement, or as pmt of a series
of related transactions or arrangements, and with a
principal purpose of avoiding having at least one of such
liabilities or payment obligations with respect to such
liabilities being treated as a bottom dollar payment
obligation as described in paragraph (b )(3)(ii)(C)(1 )(i) or
(ii) ofthis section.

b.

A bottom guarantee can be illustrated as follows:
1.

Example 1. Assume that X is a limited pmtner in a limited
pmtnership and is allocated one percent of pmtnership
profits and losses. The palinership's only debt is a
nonrecourse debt of $100 from a third paliy. X wishes to
receive an enhanced allocation of liabilities. X enters into a
bottom guarantee of $10 of the debt that is legally
enforceable under state law. The bottom guarantee is, in
effect, a guarantee of the last dollars of the debt, which is
the least risky portion of the debt. The bottom is a
guarantee of collection rather than ofpayment 18 and
provides that X shall not be obligated to make any payment
under the guarantee until the lender has exhausted its
remedies against the bonower and the collateral and has
failed to collect at least $10. Thus, in general, X will only
have economic exposure under the bottom guaranty to the
extent the value of the collateral declines below $10.

18A

guarantee of collection requires that the lender pursue its remedies against the collateral (e.g., through
foreclosure) before pursuing the guarantor for any deficiency. A guaranty of payment does not require the lender to
pursue its remedies against the collateral before pursuing the guarantor.

10

c.

The temporary regulations provide that in determining whether a
partner or related person has an obligation that will be recognized
as such for purposes of Reg. §1.752-2, the facts and circumstances
at the time of the determination will be considered and all statutory
and contractual obligations relating to the partnership liability will
be taken into account, including
contractual obligations outside the partnership agreement
such as guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement
agreements,

1.

payment obligations imposed by state or local law and
other obligations running directly to creditors, to other
partners, or to the partnership; and

11.

obligations to the partnership that are imposed by the
partnership agreement, including the obligation to make a
capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account
upon liquidation of the partnership as described in Reg.
§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3) (taking into account Reg. §1.704l(b)(2)(ii)(c)).19

111.

d.

The temporary regulations recognize that arrangements tantamount
to a BDPO can arise through the use of tiered partnerships,
intermediaries, senior and subordinate liabilities or similar
arrangements. Thus, the temporary regulations provide that these
types of arrangements can create a BDPO if, based on the facts and
circumstances, the liabilities were incurred pursuant to a common
plan, as part of a single transaction or arrangement, or as part of a
series of related transactions or arrangements, and with a principal
purpose of avoiding having at least one of such liabilities or
payment obligations with respect to such liabilities being treated as
aBDPO.
For example, if a partner's guarantee ofthe last $50 of a
$100 partnership liability is a BDPO, it should not be
possible to circumvent this result by splitting the liability
into a senior $50 liability and a junior $50 liability and
having the partner guarantee all of the former and none of
the latter.

1.

e.

19

The temporary regulations include a few exceptions.

Temporaty Reg. § 1.752-2T (b)(3)(i).
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1.

Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(3)(B)(ii)(c)(2) provides:
A payment obligation is not a bottom dollar
payment obligation merely because a maximum
amount is placed on the partner's or related person's
payment obligation, a partner's or related person's
payment obligation is stated as a fixed percentage of
every dollar of the partnership liability to which
such obligation relates, or there is a right of
proportionate contribution numing between partners
or related persons who are co-obligors with respect
to a payment obligation for which each of them is
jointly and severally liable.

11.

111.

Also, a payment obligation for a fixed percentage of every
dollar, instead of the entire amount, of a partnership
liability (a "vertical slice") is not thereby tumed into a
BDPO.

IV.

Moreover, having a right to proportionate contribution
among co-obligor partners with respect to a payment
obligation, where the partners are jointly and severally
liable, does not make the payment obligation a BDPO.

f.

Temporary Reg. § 1. 752-2T(b)(3)(ii)(B) provides that if a partner
or related person has a payment obligation that would be
recognized but for the effect of an indenmity, reimbursement
agreement or similar arrangement, such payment obligation is
recognized if, taking into account the indemnity, reimbursement
agreement, or sinlilar anangement, the partner or related person is
liable for at least 90 percent of the partner's or related person's
initial payment obligation ("90% Obligation").
1.

g.

Thus, it is pennissible to place a cap on a partner's payment
obligation without turning it into a BDPO.

Thus, if a partner's payment obligation would be
characterized as a BDPO because of the effect of an
indenmity, reimbursement agreement or similar
arrangement, but after taking such arrangement into
account, the partner is still liable for at least 90 percent of
the pmtner's initial payment obligation, then the obligation
is not a BDPO.
Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(b)(3)(iii) provides that "[a]n
indenmity, reimbursement agreement, or similar anangement will
be recognized only if, before taking into account the indemnity,
12

reimbursement agreement, or similar arr-angement, the
indemnitee's or other benefited party's payment obligation is
recognized under this paragraph (b)(3), or would be recognized
under this paragraph (b)(3) if such person were a partner or related
person."
1.

2.

Anti-Abuse Rule
a.

The Existing Regulations contain an anti-abuse rule that deals with
situations where
1.

ii.
111.

3.

a partner enters into a contractual obligation that permits a
partnership to obtain or retain a loan,
which significantly reduces the risk to the lender, and
a principal purpose of the obligation is to permit other
partners to include a portion of the loan in their outside
basis. 20

b.

In those cases, the partner would be treated as bearing the
economic risk of loss.

c.

The temporary regulations amend this provision to provide that
only the IRS is permitted to apply this anti-abuse rule.

d.

In addition, the temporary regulations allow the IRS to disregard
contractual obligations where one partner enters into a payment
obligation and another partner enters into a payment obligation
with a principal purpose to cause the former partner's contractual
obligation to be disregarded as a BDPO.

Disclosure Rules
a.

The temporary regulations impose a disclosure obligation on
partnerships that have a liability that is subject to a BDPO.
1.

20

In other words, an indemnity is not recognized if it is an
indemnity of a payment obligation that is already a BDPO.

The partnership must attach a completed Form 8275,
Disclosure Statement, with the partnership return for the
tax year in which the BDPO is undertaken or modified.
Such disclosure must identify the payment obligation,

Reg. §1.752-2G)(2).

13

include the amount of the payment obligation and the
parties to the payment obligation.

4.

b.

Interestingly, this disclosure requirement applies even though the
BDPO is disregarded for purposes of the Code Sec. 752liability
allocation rules.

c.

Additionally, to the extent that the pminership is taking the
position that the BDPO creates a recourse liability debt allocation
pursuant to the 90% Obligation, the partnership must also disclose
to the IRS on Form 8275 the facts and circumstances that clearly
establish that a partner or related person is liable for up to 90
percent of the partner's or related person's initial payment
obligation. 21

Effective Date and Transition Relief
a.

The temporary regulations are generally applicable to liabilities
incuned or assumed by a partnership and payment obligations
imposed or undertaken with respect to a partnership liability on or
after October 5, 2016, other than liabilities incuned or assumed by
a partnership and payment obligations imposed or undertaken
pursuant to a written binding contract in effect prior to that date.

b.

To ease the potential effect of these new rules, the temporary
regulations provide for a seven-year transition period. During that
period, if a partner (the "transition patiner") has a share of recourse
liabilities under Reg. §1.752-2(b) ofthe Existing Regulations, the
partnership may choose not to apply the new BDPO rules to an
amount of partnership liabilities equal to the excess of (A) the
transition partner's share of recourse liabilities over (B) its
adjusted basis in the partnership interest.

c.

The mnount of partnership liabilities to which the transition rule
· applies is reduced to the extent that the built-in gain attributable to
the transition partner's negative tax basis capital account is
recognized.
1.

21

Further, if the transition partner is a partnership, S
corporation or disregarded entity, a 50 percent or greater
change in ownership of the transition pminer will terminate
the transition period.

Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(b)(3)(ii)(D).

14

d.

D.

Because the seven-year transition rule applies only if elected by the
partnership, partners that have entered into BDPOs for partnership
liabilities should take steps to assure that the partnership makes
that election.

TECHNICAL ISSUES RAISED BY TEMPORARY REGULATIONS
1.

DROs and Capital Contribution Obligations
a.

The preamble to the temporary regulations states that "any
payment obligation under §1.752-2, including an obligation to
make a capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account
upon liquidation ofthe partnership as described in §1.7041(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3), may be a bottom dollar payment obligation if it
meets the requirements set forth above." 22

b.

Nevertheless, the actual definition of a BDPO provides no
guidance as to how to determine whether a DRO or capital
contribution obligation is a BDPO. The definition ofBDPO that
presumably is viewed by Treasury as applicable to DROs and
capital contribution obligations is as follows:
With respect to a guarantee or similar arrangement, any
payment obligation other than one in which the partner or
related person is or would be liable up to the full amount of
such partner's or related person's payment obligation if,
and to the extent that, any amount of the partnership
liability is not otherwise satisfied. 23

c.

Thus, the definition of a BDPO requires a guarantee or similar
arrangement that relates to a particular partnership liability, and a
conclusion that the obligor would not be liable for the full amount
of the obligor's payment obligation "if, and to the extent that, any
amount of the partnership liability is not othe1wise satisfied."
[Emphasis added.]

d.

In contrast, a DRO is primarily an invention of the Code Sec.

704(b) regulations, which provide a safe harbor for respecting a
partnership's allocations of profit and losses if the partnership
agreement imposes a DRO and certain other requirements are met.
The relevant Code Sec. 704(b) regulations state:

22

T.D. 8788, Preamble at 15.

23

Temporary Reg. § 1. 752-2T(b )(3)(ii)(C)(l )(i).

15

If such partner has a deficit balance in his capital account
following the liquidation of his interest in the patinership,
as determined after taking into account all capital account
adjustments for the partnership taxable year during which
such liquidation occurs (other than those made pursuant to
this requirement (3)), he is unconditionally obligated to
restore the amount of such deficit balance to the partnership
by the end of such taxable year (or, if later, within 90 days
after the date of such liquidation), which amount shall,
upon liquidation of the partnership, be paid to creditors of
the patinership or distributed to other patiners in
accordance with their positive capital account balances (in
accordance with requirement (2) of this paragraph
(b )(2)(ii)(b)). 24

e.

Thus, a DRO does not relate to a particular partnership liability,
and in fact the proceeds of the DRO payment may be paid "to
creditors of the partnership or distributed to other partners."

f.

In our experience, a "bottom" DRO is effectuated by creating a
tiered allocation of losses under the partnership agreement so that
patiners other than the partner entering into the DRO are allocated
the first losses on disposition of patinership property, and the
partner entering into the DRO is allocated the last losses. 25
1.

2.

Ninety-percent Obligations
a.

24

This creates a situation where the DRO is required to be
paid only if the partnership's propetiy loses virtually all of
its value. The definition ofBDPO in the temporary
regulations simply has no relevance to or bearing on the
determination of whether a particular DRO is a BDPO. Nor
does it aid in determining whether a capital contribution
obligation (which presumably would apply regardless of
whether the patiner has a deficit capital account) is a
BDPO.

As noted above, the 90% Obligation provisions provide relief for a
patiner whose payment obligation would be characterized as a
BDPO because of the effect of an indemnity, reimbursement
agreement or similar arrangement, provided that after taking such

Reg. §1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3).

25

See Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway & Jon G. Finkelstein, Put a 'Bottom' Deficit Restoration Obligation in
Your Partnership Liability Allocation Toolldt, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.-Dec. 2014, at 29.
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arrangement into account, the partner is still liable for at least 90
percent of the partner's initial payment obligation.
1.

b.

3.

While this provision provides some flexibility to taxpayers
who enter into these arrangements, there is some question
about the extent of relief provided.

Example 2. If partner A has a payment obligation with respect to
the entirety of a $100 partnership liability, the payment obligation
is not turned into a BDPO simply because partner B indemnifies
partner A for the top $5 of partner A's payment obligation. It
would be turned into a BDPO, however, if partner B indemnifies
partner A for the top $11 of partner A's payment obligation.
1.

Suppose instead that partner B guarantees the first $10 of a
borrowing, and partner A guarantees the next $90 of a
borrowing, which would result in a similar conclusion as to
partner A. Economically, partner A continues to be
obligated for the same $90 of the partnership liability.
However, a literal reading of Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T
seems to require that there exist an arrangement running in
favor of partner A in order to permit partner A to rely on
the exception.

n.

The preamble to the temporary regulations reinforces this
interpretation by explaining that the exception is intended
to petmit "payment obligation that would be recognized
(initial payment obligation) under Temp. Reg. § 1. 7522T(b)(3) but for the effect of an indemnity, reimbursement
agreement, or similar arrangement ... if, taking into
account the indemnity, reimbursement agreement, or
similar arrangement, the partner or related person is liable
for at least 90 percent of the initial payment obligation."

Effective Date and Transition Issues
a.

While the effective date and transition relief provide some ability
for taxpayers to continue to rely on prior law and their pre-existing
methodology for allocation of partnership liabilities, the effective
date and transition rules leave open many questions.

b.

In general, it appears that the temporary regulations would apply to
any liability incurred after the effective date, even if that liability
refinances a pre-effective-date liability that was subject to a
BDPO.
1.

It is unclear how the prospective effective date would apply
to a BDPO for a term of years entered into before the
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effective date that contains an elective or automatic
extension, subject to the right to terminate the obligation
with sufficient notice and satisfaction of specified te1ms.
n.

Arguably, if those provisions are in a written binding
contract, an extended BDPO should continue to be subject
to the Existing Regulations. However, if a BDPO is
amended on or after October 5, 2016, the BDPO would
likely be treated as a new obligation subject to the
temporary regulations. The application of the effective date
rules is explored in ~he following examples.
a)

b)

Example 3. Before the effective date of the
Temporary Regulations, a partnership enters into a
nonrecourse loan from Ban1c X with a 10-year term.
To maintain A's allocable share of the liability to
avoid gain recognition as a result of a deemed
distribution under Code Sec. 752(b) in excess of
A's basis in the partnership interest, A enters into a
bottom guarantee of the liability. A's guarantee
provides that it has an initial term of three years and
is thereafter automatically extended for successive
one-year terms un1ess A provides six-months prior
written notice to Bank X, and the partnership
satisfies specified fmancial requirements. Assume
the Temporary Regulations became effective on the
second anniversary of the partnership incurring the
· Ban1c X debt.
[i]

Presumably, A's guarantee would be
grandfathered for the balance of the initial
term because the liability was incurred, and
A's payment obligation was imposed or
undertaken, pursuant to a written binding
contract entered into before the date the
Temporary Regulations became effective.

[ii]

Would each automatic one-year extension of.
A's guarantee also be grandfathered?
Arguably, it should be, because it was
imposed or undertaken pursuant to a written
binding contract entered into before the
effective date of the temporary regulations.

Example 4. The facts are the same as in Example 3,
except that the partnership and A also enter into a
debt maintenance agreement that obligates the
18

partnership to maintain a specified level of debt that
must be guaranteed by A for a 10-year period. A's
guarantee of the Bank X liability is for the full 10year term. Assume the temporary regulations
became effective on the second anniversary of the
partnership incurring the Banlc X liability. On the
third anniversary, the partnership refinances the
Banlc X liability with a loan from Banlc Y. Under
the debt maintenance agreement, A is required to
enter into a similar bottom guarantee of the Bank Y
liability.
[i]

c)

Is A's guarantee of the Bank Y liability
grandfathered and subject to the Existing
Regulations because both the Bank Y
liability and the guarantee were undertaken
pursuant to the debt maintenance agreement,
which is a written binding contract entered
into before the effective date of the
temporary regulations?

Example 5. The facts are the same as in Example 3,
except that A has the right, but not the obligation, to
enter into a bottom guarantee of the partnership's
debt for a 10-year period under the debt
maintenance agreement.
If A enters into a bottom guarantee of the
Bank Y liability one year after the
temporary regulations became effective, is A
grandfathered under the existing Code Sec.
752 regulations because the guarantee was
"undertaken pursuant to a written binding
contract" entered into before the effective
date of the temporary regulations?

[i]

111.

The following examples illustrate that some taxpayers may
find that the seven-year transition period is not long
enough.
a)

Example 6. Before the effective date ofthe
temporary regulations, A contributed property to a
partnership subject to debt in excess of basis. To
obtain an enhanced share of partnership liabilities
and avoid gain recognition as a result of a deemed
distribution under Code Sec. 752(b) in excess of
A's basis in the partnership interest, A enters into a
19

bottom guarantee or DRO. The partnership and A
also enter into a lockout agreement that generally
provides that the partnership will not sell the
contributed property (which would trigger A's gain
under Code Sec. 704(c)) for a specified period.
Also, to further protect A's tax defenal, the lockout
agreement contains debt maintenance provisions
that obligate the partnership during the same period
to maintain a specified level of debt that may be
guaranteed by A.

IV.

[i]

As discussed above, if there is a refmancing
of the debt and A wishes to enter into a
bottom guarantee or DRO pursuant to the
debt maintenance agreement, it is unclear
whether that anangement would be
grandfathered under the binding contract
exception of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-2T(l)(2).If
the specified period extends beyond the
seven-year transition period, A will be
denied the benefit of its bargain because of a
change in the regulations that is not truly
prospective only.

[ii]

We are familiar with many real-world cases
in which the specified lockout and period
exceeds seven years, including those in
which A is an individual, and the period
ends only on A's death (at which time the
tax liability is absolved by virtue of the stepup in basis at death).

Other taxpayers may fmd that the seven-year transition rule
is inadequate because it limits relief to an amount equal to
the excess of the taxpayer's share of recourse liabilities
over basis in the partnership interest immediately before the
temporary regulations become effective.
a)

Example 7. The facts are the same as in Example 6,
except that the contributed property is depreciable,
and A enters into the bottom guarantee not because
A needs an enhanced share of the liabilities at the
time of contribution, but because A anticipates
needing an enhanced share in the future.
[i]

This often occurs with contributions of
depreciable property subject to nonrecourse
20

debt because of the phenomenon known as
"Code Sec. 704(c) burn-off." Code Sec.
704(c) burn-off refers to the fact that the
amount of Code Sec. 704(c) gain on
depreciable property contributed to a
partnership declines annually as depreciation
deductions are claimed. 26
(a)

[ii]

v.

As the Code Sec. 704(c) gain
declines annually, so does the
amount of nonrecourse debt
allocated to the contributing partner
under the second tier of Reg. § 1-7 523(a)(2).

In the context of the seven-year transition
rule, the point is that if A has a sufficient
share of nonrecourse liabilities to avoid gain
recognition immediately before the effective
date of the temporary regulations but,
nevertheless, has guaranteed debt to prevent
gain recognition in the future from an
anticipated reduction of nonrecourse
liabilities, seven-year transition relief will be
unavailable for the guaranteed liability. 27

Still other taxpayers may find that the rule terminating
seven-year transition relief when there is a change in
ownership to a transition partner that is a partnership causes
them to lose relief as a result of events they cannot control.
a)

Example 8. A is a 49-percent partner, and B is a
51-percent partner, in an upper-tier partnership
(UTP). UTP is a 30-percent partner in a lower-tier
partnership (LTP). To maintain an enhanced share
of LTP liabilities, UTP has entered into a bottom
guarantee of specified LTP liabilities. Further, A

26

Reg. §1.704-3(a)(3)(9)(ii). See generally Blake D. Rubin & Andrea M. Whiteway, Maldng Section 704(c) Sing for
You 66 N.Y.U. FEDERAL TAX INSTITUTE, ch. 9 (2008).

27

To illustrate, immediately before the effective date of the Temporary Regulations, A might have a negative $100
tax basis capital account, $100 share of nonrecomse liabilities and $20 share of recomse liabilities on account of a
guarantee entered into to prevent futme gain recognition, as A's Code Sec. 704(c) gain bums off and A's share of
nonrecourse liabilities declines. A's tax basis in the interest would be $20, and the seven-year transition rule would
be inapplicable because A's $20 share of recourse liabilities does not exceed the basis in its interest. Relief might be
available initially under the general effective date rule of Temporary Reg. §1.752-2T(l)(2) but would be lost if the
debt subject to the guarantee were refinanced.
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and B have each entered into a capital contribution
obligation requiring that ifUTP must pay on its
guarantee, A will contribute 49 percent, and B will
contribute 51 percent of the required funds to UTP,
B sells its interest to C, which also assumes B's
capital contribution obligation.
[i]

Under Temp. Reg. § 1. 752-2T(l)(3)(ii), A
loses the benefit of the seven-year transition
rule and recognizes gain on account of a
deemed distribution under Code Sec. 752(b)
that exceeds the basis in A's interest. 28 Thus,
A loses the benefit of the seven-year
transition rule even though its payment
obligation is unchanged, there is no change
in the partnership liability, and it has no
control over B 's sale.
(a)

c.

E.

The policy justification for this
seems pmticularly opaque, even
under a set of temporary regulations
whose policy justification is obscure
at best.

As illustrated by the examples above, the application of the
effective date and transition relief in real world transactions is far
from clear, and taxpayers may find themselves in situations where
they m·e losing allocations of pmtnership liabilities while they
continue to bear the real economic risk of loss for such liabilities
under the temporary regulations.

CODE SEC. 752 PROPOSED REGULATIONS
1.

Overview
a.

The Existing Regulations set fmth an anti-abuse rule pursuant to
which an obligation of a partner is not recognized if the facts and
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation. 29

28

Even if the anangement might otherwise be grandfathered under the general effective date rule of Temporary Reg.
§ 1.752-2T(1)(2), it appears that that status would be lost as a result of the technical termination ofUTP that would
occur under Code Sec. 708(b )(1 )(B). New UTP would not have incurred any liability or payment obligation prior to
the effective date. The relief for technical terminations provided by the general effective date mle of Temporary
Reg. § 1. 752-2T(1)(3)(B) applies only for purposes of the seven-year transition rule.

29

Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(3).
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i.

b.

The sole example in the Existing Regulations illustrating
the application of this rule involves a corporate subsidiary
that is formed with $0 net worth apart from its interest in a
partnership to guarantee a partnership liability in order to
allow the consolidated tax return group to enjoy losses
from the partnership property.
Proposed Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(3) expands this anti-abuse rule to
include a nonexclusive list of factors that may indicate a plan to
circumvent or avoid a payment obligation. The proposed
regulations provide that the presence or absence of any factor is
not necessarily indicative of whether a payment obligation is or is
not recognized and the weight to be given to any particular factor
depends on the particular case. The factors include the following:

1.

11.

The partner or related person is not subject to commercially
reasonable contractual restrictions that protect the
likelihood of payment, including, for example, restrictions
on transfers for inadequate consideration or distributions by
the partner or related person to equity owners in the partner
or related person.
The partner or related person is not required to provide
(either at the time the payment obligation is made or
periodically) commercially reasonable documentation
regarding the partner's or related person's financial
condition to the benefited party. 30

111.

The term of the payment obligation ends prior to the term
of the partnership liability, or the pminer or related person
has a right to terminate its payment obligation, if the
purpose of limiting the duration of the payment obligation
is to terminate such payment obligation prior to the
occurrence of an event or events that increase the risk of
economic loss to the guarantor or benefited patiy. 31

IV.

There exists a plan or arrangement in which the primary
obligor or any other obligor (or a person related to the

3

<Note that in order to avoid this factor, it appears to be necessary to impose an obligation to provide such
documentation both at inception of the obligation and periodically thereafter.

31

Proposed Reg. § 1. 752-20)(3) clarifies that "[t]his factor typically will not be present if the termination of the
obligation occurs by reason of an event or events that decrease the risk of economic loss to the guarantor or
benefited party (for example, the payment obligation terminates upon the completion of a building construction
project, upon the leasing of a building, or when cetiain income and asset coverage ratios are satisfied for a specified
number of quarters)."
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obligor) with respect to the partnership liability directly or
indirectly holds money or other liquid assets in an amount
that exceeds the reasonable foreseeable needs of such
obligor.
v.

The payment obligation does not pemlit the creditor to
promptly pursue payment following a payment default on
the pminership liability, or other anangements with respect
to the partnership liability or payment obligation otherwise
indicate a plan to delay collection.

v1.

In the case of a guarantee or similar arrangement, the tem1s
of the partnership liability would be substantially the Sallle
had the partner or related person not agreed to provide the
guarantee.

vn.

The creditor or other party benefiting from the obligation
did not receive executed documents with respect to the
payment obligation from the pminer or related person
before, or within a commercially reasonable petiod oftin1e
after, the creation of the obligation. 32

c.

Since 2006, Reg. §1.752-2(k) of the Existing Regulations has
provided that the owner of a disregarded entity (such as a singleowner LLC) will be treated as bearing the economic risk of loss for
a partnership liability only to the extent of the net value of the
disregarded entity, as defmed in the Existing Regulations.
1.

11.

32

In general, the "net value" of the disregarded entity is equal
to fair market value of its assets less its liabilities,
disregarding the value of its interest in the pminership
whose liabilities are being allocated. The point is to
recogtlize that, although the owner of the disregarded entity
is the taxpayer affected by partnersllip liability allocations,
the state law liability shield provided by the disregarded
entity effectively precludes the taxpayer from bearing any
economic risk of loss beyond the net value of the
disregarded entity.

The proposed regulations would elinlinate this regime
applicable for disregarded entities that are partners and
substitute a much broader mle applicable to all pminers.
Specifically, the proposed regulations provide that:

Proposed Reg. §1.752-2(j)(3)(ii).
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Evidence of a plan to circumvent or avoid an
obligation is deemed to exist if the facts and
circumstances indicate that there is not a reasonable ·
expectation that the payment obligor will have the
ability to make the required payments if the
payment obligation becomes due and payable ... 33
2.

Issues Raised by Proposed Regulations
a.

The first two factors require commercially reasonable financial
documentation and commercially reasonable restrictions on
transfer of the obligor's assets.
1.

b.

Although the determination of what is "commercially
reasonable" is likely unclear in many situations, as a
practical matter taxpayers could likely avoid falling afoul
of these factors by inserting "magic language" in the
documents creating the obligation.

The third factor looks to whether the term of the pa)'ment
obligation ends or can be terminated prior to the partnership's
obligation payment obligation becoming due and payable, if the
purpose of limiting the duration of the payment obligation is to
terminate it prior to the occurrence of an event that increases the
risk of the obligor.
i.

This is consistent with the view that partners should not be
able to eliminate their recourse liability when the likelihood
of having to pay increases and should be interpreted to
allow early termination of the obligation where the purpose
is not to terminate it prior to an event that increases the
obligor's risk, such as in the situation described in Example

9.
a)

33

Example 9. A real estate loan is required by the
lender to be fully guaranteed by a partner. The
partner is allowed to sell his interest in the
partnership to a credit-worthy purchaser who
guarantees the loan, in which case the original
partner-guarantor has the right to be released from
the guarantee. This should not fall afoul of the third
factor because the purpose is not to terminate the

Proposed Reg. §1.752-2(j)(3)(iii).
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obligation prior to an event that increases the
obligor's risk.

c.

The fourth faCtor looks to whether the partnership is holding
money or other liquid assets in excess of its reasonably foreseeable
needs.
1.

Under the Existing Regulations, in applying the
constructive liquidation test, all assets including cash held
by the partnership are deemed to be worthless.

11. .

Under the proposed regulations, in cases where a
pminership holds significant liquid assets, the fourth factor
will create the risk of disagreement over whether such
holdings are in excess of reasonably foreseeable needs.

d.

The fifth factor looks to whether there are limitations on the ability
of the creditor to promptly pursue payment following a payment
default on the pminership liability, or other arrangements that
indicate a plan to delay collection.
1.

e.

Any guarantee of collection is arguably afoul ofthis factor.
As noted above, a guarantee of collection requires that the
creditor pursue its remedies againstthe bcmower and the
collateral prior to pursuing the guarantor. These
anangements are commonplace in secured real estate
lending transactions that are entered into for non-tax
reasons, and the treatment of such anangements as
evidencing a plan or arrangement to avoid the obligation is
misguided.
Even more troubling is the sixth factor, which looks to whether the
loan terms would be "substantially the same" without the payment
obligation.

1.

11.

Presumably, avoiding this factor will require the taxpayer
to demonstrate that it received better loan terms by virtue of
the presence of the payment obligation. Indeed, the
language suggests that the loan tenns must be
"substantially" better. Avoiding this factor will require the
taxpayer to demonstrate what the loan terms would be with
and without the guarantee, which in many cases will be
challenging.
Moreover, the extent to which the loan tetms were or were
not improved due to the payment obligation does not seem
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to have any bearing on whether the taxpayer has a plan or
intention to avoid the obligation. 34
111.

f.

Apparently, any guarantee that is created after the inception
of the loan, even though legally enforceable, will be afoul
ofthis factor.

The seventh factor is that the creditor or other party benefiting
from the obligation did not receive executed documents with
respect to the payment obligation from the partner or related
person before, or within a commercially reasonable period oftime
after, the creation of the obligation.
1.

g.

Frankly, we believe that the requirement that the creditor
receive executed documents is inherent under existing law
and required to conclude that the payment obligation is
legally enforceable, which of course is required for it to be
taken into account for tax purposes.
Unlike the objective and administrable rules ofthe Existing
Regulations, the first, second, fourth and sixth factors require a
determination of the meaning of the terms "commercially
reasonable," "reasonable needs" and "substantially the same."

1.

These amorphous and subjective tests will require partners
and partnerships to make difficult, if not impossible,
judgments in order to determine whether a particular
obligation can be taken into account.

11.

Given the amorphous and subjective nature ofthese tests,
we expect that IRS agents will challenge many payment
obligations on the grounds that the commercially
reasonable, reasonable needs, or substantially the same
factors are not met, if a challenge would result in an
increase in tax.

111.

We are particularly disappointed that the proposed
regulations would require a subjective analysis of an
obligation for it to be taken into account, given the public

34

The Preamble to the Proposed Regulations states that the fact that the loan terms were not improved by agreeing to
the payment obligation indicates that the guarantee was not required by lender. Of course, it might also indicate that
the lender was not willing to make the loan without the guarantee (which might raise issues under Plantation
Patterns Inc., 29 TCM 817, Dec. 30,219(M), TC Memo. 1970-182, aff'd, CA-5, 72-2 USTC ~9494, 462 F2d 712). In
any case, the presence or absence of this factor does not bear on whether there is a plan to avoid the obligation.
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statements by the IRS and Treasury representatives
preceding the issuance of the earlier proposed regulations
that any new rules concerning such a determination under
Code Sec. 752 would be objective and mechanical. 35
h.

Most troubling of all is the per se rule in Proposed Reg. § 1. 7 522G)(3)(iii) that a plan to circumvent a payment obligation is
deemed to exist if the facts and circumstances indicate that there is
not a reasonable expectation that the payment obligor will have the
ability to make the required payments if the payment obligation
becomes due and payable (the "Reasonable Expectation
Requirement").
1.

The other factors discussed above are nonexclusive and to
be given varying weight depending on the facts and
circumstances. In contrast, failure to meet the Reasonable
Expectation Requirement automatically results in a deemed
plan to circumvent the obligation, which automatically
results in the obligation being disregarded.

11.

The Reasonable Expectation Requirement is entirely
inconsistent with the so-called presumption of solvency in
the Existing Regulations that an obligor will perfom1 on its
obligations irrespective of its net worth set fmih in Reg.
§1.752-2.
a)

The proposed regulations do not explicitly amend
the presumption of solvency, so it is unclear how
the presumption of solvency is intended to co-exist
with the Reasonable Expectation Requirement.

b)

The Reasonable Expectation Requirement would
place an affrm1ative burden on the obligor to
establish that an expectation of satisfaction of a
payment obligation is reasonable, which defeats the
purpose of and is inconsistent with the presumption
of solvency. It is the exception that completely
undoes the general rule of the presumption of
solvency, rather than proving the general rule.

35

See Elliott, Guarantors May Need to Document Net Worth, Katz Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 30,2013, at 1528
("Craig Gerson, attorney-advisor, Treasmy Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, said the government is designing the
test in the regs to be mechanical in nature," and Clifford Wanen, senior counsel for the Service's Office of
Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries), "added that the government is trying to avoid using
phrases like 'business purpose' and 'commercially reasonable' in the gnidance. 'We want it to be a more objective
test, to be fi·ank. We don't want to be litigating about what's right and what's wrong in this area,' he said.").
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111.

F.

While failure to meet the Reasonable Expectation
Requirement results automatically in disregarding a
payment obligation, determining whether the Reasonable
Expectation Requirement is met in a particular case could
hardly be more uncertain.
a)

To begin with, what level of probability or
likelihood of payment needs to be present in order
to conclude that there is a "reasonable expectation
that the payment obligor will have the ability to
make the required payments if the payment
obligation becomes due and payable"? Lacking any
guidance on this point-and there is none-one
could argue as plausibly for a 10-percent likelihood
of payment as for a 90-percent likelihood, or
anywhere in between.

b)

Whatever the required likelihood, when is it
measured? At the time the payment obligation is
entered into? At the end of every year that the
payment obligation is taken into account for
purposes of Code Sec. 752? At any time that there
is a change in expectation?

c)

What does it mean to "have the ability to make the
required payments if the obligation becomes due
and payable"? Does that require an ability to pay all
principal in the event of default, or only to pay
regular debt service as it comes due? How does one
prove the reasonable expectation? Will all
guarantors be required to tender to the IRS
comprehensive financial statements to demonstrate
the ability to pay?

d)

The issues are legion, and we foresee that IRS
auditors will use the massive uncertainty inherent in
the Reasonable Expectation Requirement, together
with the draconian consequences of violating it, to
hammer taxpayers.

CODE SEC. 704(B) PROPOSED REGULATIONS
1.

As part of this same regulatory package, Treasury issued proposed
regulations under Code Sec. 704(b) (the "Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed
Regulations"). While a detailed discussion of these changes is beyond the
scope of this outline, some mention is appropriate because of their

29

relationship to the Code Sec. 752 temporary regulations and proposed
regulations.
2.

The Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations would make changes to the
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations regarding when a DRO is respected that
conespond to the provisions of the temporary regulations and proposed
regulations.
a.

The first change, corr-esponding to the temporary regulations, is
that a DRO would not be respected if it is disregarded BDP0. 36

b.

The second change in the Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations,
corr-esponding to the Code Sec. 752 proposed regulations, is that a
DRO would not be recognized if the facts and circumstances
indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation.
1.

As with the Code Sec. 752 regulations, the Code Sec.
704(b) Proposed Regulations include a nonexclusive list of
factors that may indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation. 37

n.

The Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations provide that
the presence or absence of any factor is not necessarily
indicative of whether a payment obligation is or is not
recognized, and the weight to be given to any particular
factor depends on the patiicular case. Proposed Reg.
§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(C)(4)(B) includes the following factors:
a)

The partner is not subject to commercially
reasonable provisions for enforcement and
collection of the obligation.

b)

The partner is not required to provide (either at the
time the obligation is made or periodically)
commercially reasonable documentation regarding
the partner's financial condition to the patinership.

c)

The obligation ends or could, by its terms, be
te1minated before the liquidation of the partner's

36Proposed

Reg. § 1. 704-1 (b )(2)(ii)(c)(4)(A). As discussed above, unfortunately, the Temporary Regulations do not
provide any guidance to detennine whether a DRO is a BDPO. Reg. § 1. 704-2(m), Example I (vii} specifically
addresses the consequences of a "bottom" guarantee on the computation of "minimum gain" under the Code Sec.
704(b) regulations, but does not in any way suggest that the "bottom" guarantee is illusory or should be disregarded.
Presumably due to a technical oversight, the Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations would not make any change to
that example.
37Proposed

Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c)(4)(B).
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interest in the partnership or when the partner's
capital account as provided in Reg. § 1. 704l(b)(2)(iv) is negative.
d)

G.

The terms of the obligation are not provided to all
the partners in the partnership in a timely manner.

111.

A common provision in partnership agreements that have
DROs is that a partner having a DRO can transfer his
partnership interest if the transferee agrees to the same
DRO. Such a provision would presumably fall afoul of the
factor in Proposed Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(C)(4)(B)(iii).

IV.

Another concern is that the effective date of the Code Sec.
704(b) Proposed Regulations is that the new rules would
"apply on or after the date these regulations are published
as final regulations in the Federal Register." Thus, there is
no transition relief for binding DROs that were entered into
before the date the Code Sec. 704(b) Proposed Regulations
were published.

v.

Partners who entered into DROs in reliance on the existing
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations could find that those DROs
cease to be taken into account because the various factors
listed in Proposed Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(4)(B) are not
met. Putting aside the merits of the proposed changes to the
Code Sec. 704(b) regulations, the failure to provide
transition relief for pre-existing DROs is entirely
inappropriate.

CONCLUSION
1.

Managing the allocation of partnership liabilities is critical to achieving a
partner's tax planning goals. The amendments to the partnership debt
allocation rules in the temporary regulations and proposed regulations are
among the most significant changes in partnership tax law in more than 20
years. In many cases, the changes would result in the recognition of
taxable gain by partners or limit partners' ability to take losses into
account as a result of a reduction in their allocable share of partnership
liabilities.

2.

In contrast to the existing regulations on the allocation of partnership
recourse liabilities, which are largely mechanical and administrable, the
proposed regulations would impose unclear, subjective, and in some cases,
noncommercial requirements on payment obligations commonly entered
into by partners in order for those obligations to be taken into account
under Code Sec. 752.
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3.

ill.

We suggest that both the temporary regulations and the proposed
regulations under Code Sec. 752 be withdrawn. We believe that the
changes to the Code Sec. 707 regulations that were published at the same
time adequately addressed Treasury's concerns about the use of debt
allocations to avoid gain in leveraged partnership and other similar
transactions, and that these further changes impose an entirely
unworkable, unnecessary and burdensome regime on every partnership
and partnership liability that is inconsistent with sound tax policy.

TEMPORARY REGULATIONS UNDER CODE SEC. 707
A.

BACKGROUND
1.

It is widely understood that the original motivation for the revisions to the
Code Sec. 752 regulations was to limit taxpayers' ability to stmcture a socalled "leveraged partnership" transaction that complies with the debtfinanced distribution exception to the partnership disguised sale mles
under Code Sec. 707. 38

2.

The proposed Code Sec. 752 regulations issued on January 29, 2014 39 (the
"20 14 Proposed Regulations") actually did little to curtail leveraged
partnership transactions, and in response to comments on those proposed
regulations, the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation directly and
effectively addresses the issue.

3.

The basic mle of the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation is that a
partner's share of a liability for purposes of the disguised sale mles is
determined by reference to the partner's share of partnership profits.
a.

B.

This mle applies regardless of whether the liability is a recourse
liability for which the partner bears the economic risk of loss under
the Code Sec. 752 regulations, which is a major departure from the
prior regulations under Code Sec. 707.

PARTNERSHIP DISGUISED SALES: IN GENERAL
1.

Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) provides that, if:

38Amy

S. Elliott, TreaSUIJi Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules, 2014 TNT 38-4 (Mar. 3, 2014)
(quoting Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel, as saying "When we were conside1ing changes in the
Code Sec. 752 rules related to [the debt-financed distribution] exception, we determined that certain principles that
were being applied for just Code Sec. 707 purposes ought to apply equally in non-disguised sale cases").
39REG-119305-11.

For a discussion of the 2014 Proposed Regulations, see Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway &
Jon G. Finkelstein, Proposed Partnership Liability Allocation Regulations: An Unworkable Solution in Search of a
Problem, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, July-August 2014, at 41.
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a.

There is a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property by
a partner to a partnership;

b.

There is a related direct or indirect transfer of money or other
property by the partnership to such partner (or another partner);
and

c.

The transfers described in clauses (i) and (ii), when viewed
together, are properly characterized as a sale or exchange of
property,

such transfers shall be treated either as a transaction occurring between the
partnership and one who is not a partner, or as a transaction between two
or more partners acting other than in their capacity as members of the
partnership.
2.

Similarly, the regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) provide:
a.

A transfer of property (excluding money or an obligation to
contribute money) by a partner to a partnership and a transfer of
money or other consideration (including the assumption of or the
taking subject to a liability) by the partnership to the partner
constitute a sale of property, in whole or in part, by the partner to
the partnership only if based on all the facts and circumstances:
i.

The transfer of money or other consideration would not
have been made but for the transfer of property; and

n.

In cases in which the transfers are not made

simultaneously, the subsequent transfer is not dependent on
the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations. 40
3.

The regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) also deal with the treatment
of liabilities. The Senate Report relating to the disguised sale legislation in
1984 provided direction regarding the treatment of liabilities:
The disguised sale provision also will apply to the extent (1) the
transferor partner receives the proceeds of a loan related to the
property to the extent responsibility for the repayment of the loan
rests, directly or indirectly, with the partnership (or its assets) or
the partners, or (2) the partner has received a loan related to the
property in anticipation of the transaction and responsibility for

40Reg,

§1.707-3(b).
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repayment of the loan is transferred, directly or indirectly, to the
partnership (or its assets) or the other partners _41
4.

The Conference Report relating to the disguised sale legislation in 1985
(the "Conference Report") contemplated an analysis of who (or whose
assets) bears responsibility for the repayment of a loan for purposes of
determining whether (1) a partnership's distlibution to a contributing
partner of the proceeds ()fa partnership liability or (2) a partnership's
assumption of, or taking subject to a contributing partner's liability,
constitutes a disguised sale.

5.

Regarding the former case, the Conference Report elaborated:
The conferees wish to note that when a partner of a partnership
contributes property to the partnership and that property is
borrowed against, pledged as collateral for a loan, or otherwise
refmanced, and the proceeds of the loan are distributed to the
cmitributing partner, there will be no disguised sale under the
provision to the extent the contributing partner, in substance,
retains liability for repayment of the borrowed amounts (i.e., to the
extent the other partners have no direct or indirect risk of loss with
respect to such amounts) since, in effect, the partner has simply
borrowed through the partnership. However, to the extent the other
pminers directly or indirectly bear the risk ofloss with respect to
the borrowed amounts, this may constitute a payment to the
contributing partner. 42

6.

The regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) establish a general rule for
situations in which a partnership assumes or takes subject to a contributing
pminer's liability that reflects the framework provided in the Conference
Repmi. Specifically, Reg. §1.707-5(a)(l) provides:
For purposes of this section and §§1.707-3 and 1.707-4, ... if the
pminership assumes or takes property subject to a liability of the
paliner other than a qualified liability, the palinership is treated as
transferring consideration to the paliner to the extent that the
amount of the liability exceeds the pminer's share of that liability
in1lllediately after the partnership assumes or takes subject to the

41

S. Rep. No. 98-169 (P.L. 98-369) at 321 (1984).

42

H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, at 862 (1984).
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liability as provided in paragraphs (a)(2), (3) and (4) ofthis
section. 43
7.

Similarly, the regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) implement the
"borrowing through the partnership" exception to disguised sale treatment.
Specifically, Reg. § 1. 707 -5(b)(2) provides:
For purposes of § 1. 707-3, if a partner transfers property to a
partnership, and the partnership incurs a liability and all or a
portion of the proceeds of that liability are allocable under § 1.1638T to a transfer of money or other consideration to the partner
made within 90 days of incurring the liability, the transfer of
money or other consideration to the partner is taken into account
only to the extent that the amount of money or the fair market
value of the other consideration transferred exceeds that partner's
allocable share of the partnership liability.

C.

8.

The language from the Conference Report regarding "responsibility for
the repayment of the loan" was incorporated into the regulations under
Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) through the concept of a partner's "share" of a
liability in Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(1).

9.

The regime for determining a partner's share of a liability was
fundamentally revised by the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation. To
understand this change, it is helpful first to review the rules that preceded
the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation.

LIABILITIES UNDER THE PRIOR DISGUISED SALE REGULATIONS
1.

Under the prior disguised sale regulations, before the temporary Code Sec.
707 regulation, an initial distinction was made between a recourse and a
nonrecourse liability by reference to the regulations under Code Sec. 752.
a.

Regarding a recourse liability, the prior disguised sale regulations
provided:
A partner's share of a recourse liability of the partnership
equals the partner's share of the liability under the rules of
section 752 and the regulations thereunder. A partnership
liability is a recourse liability to the extent that the
obligation is a recourse liability under §1.752-l(a)(1) or

43 This

column does not deal with a partnership's assumption of, or taking subject to "qualified liabilities," which
generally are not treated as giving rise to consideration in a disguised sale unless they are assumed or taken subject
to, in connection with a transaction otherwise treated as a disguised sale.
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would be treated as a recourse liability under that section if
it were treated as a partnership liability for purposes of that
section. 44
b.

Regarding a nonrecourse liability, the prior disguised sale
regulations provided:
A partner's share of a nonrecourse liability of the
partnership is determined by applying the same percentage
used to determine the partner's share of the excess
nonrecourse liability under § 1. 7 52-3 (a)(3). A partnership
liability is a nonrecourse liability of the partnership to the
extent that the obligation is a nonrecourse liability under
§ 1.752-l(a)(2) or would be a nonrecourse liability of the
partnership under §1.752-l(a)(2) if it were treated as a
partnership liability for purposes of that section. 45

2.

As discussed above, under the Code Sec. 752 regulations, a partnership
liability is a recourse liability to the extent a partner bears the "economic
risk of loss" for the liability, and a recourse liability is allocated to the
patiner that bears the economic risk ofloss. 46 A partnership liability is a
nonrecourse liability to the extent no patiner is treated as bearing the
economic risk of loss for the liability. 47

3.

Also as discussed above, the Code Sec. 752 regulations establish a threetier system for allocating nonrecourse liabilities.
a.

The prior disguised sale regulations provided that a patiner's share
of a nonrecourse liability was dete1mined by applying the same
percentage used to determine the partner's share of the "excess
nonrecourse liability" under the Code Sec. 752 regulations (i.e., the
excess of the liability that is not allocated pursuant to the first or
second tier). 48

44

Prior Reg. §1.707-5(a)(2)(i).

45

Prior Reg. §1.707-5(a)(2)(ii).

46

Reg. §1.752-l(a)(l) and Reg. §1.751-2(a).

47

Reg. § 1. 752-l(a)(2).

48

Plior Reg. § 1.707 -5(a)(2)(ii). The first and second tiers (often referred to as the "minimum gain" tier and the
"Section 704(c) minimum gain" tier) generally allocate a pmtion of the nomecourse liability to pattners that would
be allocated gain pursuant to a minimum gain chargeback or Code Sec. 704(c) if the property were disposed of
solely in satisfaction of the nomecourse liability.
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4.

The general rule for excess nomecourse liabilities is that they are allocated
in accordance with a partner's share of (or interest in) partnership profits
(the "General Rule"). 49 In general, a partner's interest in partnership
profits is determined "by taking into account all facts and circumstances
relating to the economic arrangement of the partners." 50

5.

As described above, the Code Sec. 752 regulations also provide certain
specific methods for determining a partner's interest in partnership profits.
a.

The partnership agreement may specify a partner's interest in
partnership profits in a manner that is "reasonably consistent with
allocations (that have substantial economic effect under the section
704(b) regulations) of some other significant item of partnership
income or gain" (the "Significant Item Method"). 5 1

b.

Also, a partnership may allocate an excess nomecourse liability "in
accordance with the manner in which it is reasonably expected that
the deductions attributable to those nomecourse liabilities will be
allocated" (the "Alternative Method").

c.

Finally, there is also an "Additional Method," which allows the
excess nomecourse liability to be allocated to a partner up to the
amount of built-in gain that would be allocated to the partner under
Code Sec. 704(c) (or Code Sec. 704(c) principles if the property
has been revalued under the Code Sec. 704(b) regulations) if the
property subject to the liability were sold to the extent such built-in
gain exceeds the built-in gain taken into account in the second tier.

6.

Under the prior Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) regulations, the Significant Item
Method and the Alternative Method were available for purposes of
determining a partner's share of a nomecourse liability, in addition to the
General Rule. The Additional Method was not permitted to be used for
purposes of the disguised sale regulations. 52

7.

With this framework, the following is a simplified example ofhow a
leveraged partnership transaction could work under the prior disguised
sale regulations, before the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation:

a.

49

Example 10. A transfers property X, with a fair market value of
$100, to partnership AB. B transfers $95 of other property.

Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3).

sold.
5!Jd.
52

Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3).
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Immediately after the transfer, AB bonows $95 and distributes the
proceeds of the bonowing to A. A guarantees the liability so that
only A bears the economic risk of loss for the liability. Because the
entire liability is allocable to A, A has not been distributed money
in excess of A's allocable share of the liability under the prior
Code Sec. 707 regulations. Accordingly, A receives the $95 as a
distribution under Code Sec. 731 (a) that is not treated as part of a
disguised sale and not cunently taxable.
1.

8.

In Canal Cmp., 53 the Tax Comi analyzed the application ofthe disguised
sale mles to a leveraged partnership transaction. Without going into the
facts, the transaction depended on a liability of the patinership being
treated as a recourse liability to the partner that received the proceeds of
the partnership liability. The IRS successfully challenged the transaction
by assetiing an anti-abuse mle in the Code Sec. 752 regulations. 54
a.

9.

A similar result could be achieved if A encumbered X
immediately prior to transfening X subject to the liability
to AB. If A guaranteed the liability so that only A bore the
economic risk of loss for the liability, then, under the prior
disguised sale regulations, A's share of the liability after
the transfer would equal the entire amount of the liability,
and accordingly none of the liability would be treated as
consideration received by A in a disguised sale.

The anti-abuse mle (discussed above) provided that a partner or
related person's payment obligation may be disregarded if facts
and circun1stances indicate that a principal purpose of the
anangement is to eliminate the patiner's or related person's
economic risk of loss with respect to that obligation or create the
appearance of the partner or related person bearing the economic
risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the anangement is
otherwise. 55

The preamble to the 2014 Proposed Regulations noted:
The IRS and the Treasury Depaiiment have considered whether the
approach of the existing regulations under §1.752-2 is appropriate
given that, in most cases, a partnership will satisfy its liabilities

53

Canal Corp., 135 TC 199, Dec. 58,298 (2010).

54

The taxpayer in Canal Corp. was in bankruptcy at the time of the Tax Court decision. It did not pursue an appeal
of the Tax Court decision, and it entered into a settlement with the IRS to settle the $106.7 million judgment for
about $2 million. For a detailed discussion of the Canal Corp. case, see Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway &
Jon G. Finkelstein, Tax Court Takes Wrong Turn in Canal, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 41.
55

Reg. §1.752-2(j).
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with partnership profits, the partnership's assets do not become
worthless, and the payment obligations of partners or related
persons are not called upon. The IRS and the Treasury Department
are concerned that some partners or related persons have entered
into payment obligations that are not commercial solely to achieve
an allocation of a partnership liability to such partner.
10.

The preamble went on to explain:
Accordingly, the proposed regulations provide a rule that
obligations to make a payment with respect to a partnership
liability (excluding those imposed by state law) will not be
recognized for purposes of section 752 unless certain factors are
present.

11.

D.

The 2014 Proposed Regulations would not have upended the basic
distinction in the treatment of recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under
the disguised sale regulations. Rather, the regulations would have
significantly limited the extent to which a liability would be treated as a
recourse liability primarily by expanding the situations in which a
payment obligation would be disregarded.

TEMPORARY CODE SEC. 707 REGULATION
1.

The temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation provides the following:
a.

For purposes of§ 1.707-5, a partner's share of a liability of a
partnership, as defined in§ 1.752-1(a) (whether a recourse liability
or a nonrecourse liability) is determined by applying the same
percentage used to determine the partner's share of the excess
nonrecourse liability under§ 1.752-3(a)(3) (as limited in its
application to this paragraph (a)(2)), but such share shall not
exceed the partner's share of the partnership liability under section
752 and applicable regulations (as limited in the application of§
1.752-3(a)(3) to this paragraph (a)(2)). 56
i.

This provision replaces the prior regulations that provided
one rule for recourse liabilities and another for nonrecourse
liabilities.
a)

56

As a result, for purposes of the disguised sale rules,
a partner's share of recourse and nonrecourse
liabilities is now determined by reference to the
partner's share of excess nonrecourse liabilities.

Reg. § 1. 707 -5T(a)(2)(i).
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The preamble to the 2016 Regulations under the
disguised sale rules explained:
[T]he Treasury Department and the IRS
have concluded that, for disguised sale
purposes only, it is appropriate for partners
to determine their share of any partnership
liability, whether recourse or nonrecourse
under section 752, in the manner in which
excess nonrecourse liabilities are allocated
under Sec. 1.752-3(a)(3), as limited for
disguised sale purposes in the 752 Final
Regulations.
In connection with Temporary Code Sec. 707 Regulation, the IRS
also revised the language of the "third tier" in Reg. §1.752-3(a)(3),
so that it provides, "The significant item method, altemative
method, and additional method do not apply for purposes of
§ 1.707-5(a)(2)."

b.

1.

2.

As a result, for purposes of the disguised sale rules, a
partner's share of a liability is therefore dete1mined only by
reference to the General Rule for excess nonrecourse
liabilities (i.e., the Significant Item Method and the
Altemative Method are no longer available). 57

The consequences of the temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation can be
illustrated by applying it to the same example used above:

Example 11. A transfers property X, with a fair market value of
$100, to partnership AB. B transfers $95 of other property.
Immediately after the transfer, AB encumbers X with a $95
liability and distributes the proceeds of the borrowing to A. A
guarantees the liability so that only A bears the economic risk of
loss for the liability. Assume A's share ofpminership profits is
5%. Therefore, A's share of the liability is $5. The remaining $90
is in excess of A's allocable share of the liability. Accordingly, A
receives the $90 of taxable consideration as part of a disguised sale
ofXtoAB.

a.

1.

In this case, A's guarantee of the liability is not relevant for
the disguised sale analysis. Under the same facts, if A had

57

For a discussion ofiRS's concem with the use of these methods in the disguised sale context, see Blake D. Rubin
& Andrea M. Whiteway, Here Comes the Kitchen Sink: IRS Throws 'Eve1ything But' at Two Partnership Tax
Deferral Structures, J. PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES, Mar.-Apr. 2003.
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not guaranteed the liability, A's allocable share of the
liability would still be $5 based on A's 5% share of AB's
profits. The result would also be the same if A encumbered
X with a $95 liability in anticipation of the contribution,
contributed X to AB subject to the liability, and guaranteed
the liability.
3.

4.

The preamble to the 2014 Proposed Regulations noted that Treasury and
the IRS "are aware of the difficulty in determining a partner's interest in
partnership profits in other than very simple partnerships and, therefore,
recognize the need to have a bright-line measure of a partner's interest in
partnership profits."
a.

The 2014 Proposed Regulations proposed looking to a partner's
proportionate share of the partnership on a liquidation basis as a
bright-line test for measuring a partner's share of partnership
profits. Commenters raised numerous and significant problems
with the liquidation approach to the allocation of excess
nomecourse liabilities (summarized in the preamble to the 2016
Regulations), and the IRS abandoned this proposal in the 2016
Regulations.

b.

The Treasury did not, however, provide an alternative bright-line
test in the 2016 Regulations for determining a partner's interest in
partnership profits. The observation in the preamble to the 2014
Proposed Regulations about the difficulty in many circumstances
of determining a partner's interest in partnership profits remains
valid, and the significance of this determination has been greatly
increased by the Temporary Code Sec. 707 Regulation by causing
this standard to be applicable to all liabilities for purposes of the
disguised sale mles.

The regulations under Code Sec. 707(a)(2)(B) take account of a situation
in which a partner's share of a liability changes, dealing with a so-called
"anticipatory reduction." This mle provides:
a.

For purposes of this section, a partner's share of a liability,
immediately after a partnership assumes or takes property subject
to the liability, is determined by taking into account a subsequent
reduction in the partner's share if:
1.

11.

At the time that the partnership assumes or takes property
subject to the liability, it is anticipated that the transferring
partner's share of the liability will be subsequently reduced;
The anticipated reduction is not subject to the
entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations; and
41

111.

5.

The reduction of the partner's share of the liability is part
of a plan that has as one of its principal purposes
minimizing the extent to which the assumption of or taking
property subject to the liability is treated as part of a sale
under § 1. 707-3. 58

Clause (ii) was added as part of the 2016 Regulations. The 2016
Regulations revise an example in the regulations providing an illustration
of the anticipatory reduction rule. 59 The example can be summarized as
follows:
a.

Example 12. C transfers property Y to a partnership in which C
has a 50% interest. At the time of its transfer to the pminership,
property Y has a fair market value of $10,000,000 and is subject to
an $8,000,000 liability. Property Y is a fully leased office building,
the rental income from prope1ty Y is sufficient to meet debt
service, and the remaining term of the liability is 10 years. Under
Code Sec. 752, immediately after the partnership's assumption of
the liability encumbering property Y, the liability is a recourse
liability of the partnership, and C's share of that liability is
$8,000,000. For disguised sale purposes, C's share of the liability
immediately after the partnership's assumption is $4,000,000 (50%
of $8,000,000). It is anticipated that, three years after the
partnership's assumption of the liability, C's share of the liability
for disguised sale purposes will be reduced to $2,000,000 because
of a shift in the allocation of partnership profits pursuant to the
te1ms of the partnership agreement, which provide that C's share
of the partnership profits will be 25% at that time.
Under the partnership agreement, this shift in the allocation of
partnership profits is dependent solely on the passage of time.
Therefore, if the reduction in C' s share of the liability was
anticipated at the time of C' s transfer, was not subject to the
entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations, and was part of a
plan that has as one of its principal purposes minimizing the extent
of sale treatment under Reg. § 1. 707-3 (that is, a principal purpose
of allocating a larger percentage of profits to C in the first three
years when profits were not likely to be realized was to minimize
the extent to which C' s transfer would be treated as part of a sale),
C's share of the liability immediately after the partnership's
assumption is treated as equal to C's reduced share of $2,000,000.
Thus, the amount of consideration to Cis $6,000,000 (the excess

58

Reg. §1.707-5(a)(3).

59

Reg. §1.707-ST(f), Example 3.
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of the liability assumed by the partnership ($8,000,000) over C's
share of the liability for disguised sale purposes immediately after
the assumption ($2,000,000)), taking into account the anticipated
reduction in C' s share of the liability pursuant to the terms of the
partnership agreement.
i.

11.

This example implies that, in the absence of the
anticipatory reduction rule, C' s share of partnership profits,
and therefore C's share of the liability, would have been
50%. Thus, the example implies that the subsequent
reduction inC's profit share is ignored for purposes of
determining C's share of profits under the General Rule.
Needless to say, this "snapshot" approach to determining
C's share of profits is not the only plausible way to make
that determination. For example, commentators have
suggested that the determination might be based on the
partner's anticipated share of overall partnership profits
·over the life of the partnership. 60

6.

The temporary Code Sec. 707 regulation generally looks to a partner's
share of partnership profits in determining the partner's share of a liability,
but there is a limitation at the end of the provision, which provides, "such
share shall not exceed the partner's share of the partnership liability under
section 752 and applicable regulations (as limited in the application of§
1.752-3(a)(3) to this paragraph (a)(2))" (the "Code Sec. 752
Limitation"). 61

7.

The application of the Code Sec. 752 Limitation can be illustrated as
follows:
a.

Example 13. C transfers property X, with a fair market value of
$100, to partnership AB. Immediately after the transfer, AB
encumbers X with a $50 liability and distributes the proceeds of
the borrowing to C. A guarantees all the liabilities of AB,

See, e.g., WilliamS. McKee, William F. Nelson & Robert L. Whitmire, WARREN, GORHAM & LAMONT, at~
13.03[2][b] (4th ed 2007).

60

61

When the Temporary Code Sec. 707 Regulation was initially issued, the Code Sec. 752 Limitation was formulated
differently, as follows," ... without including in such partner's share any amount of the liability for which another
partner bears the economic risk ofloss for the partnership liability under Sec. 1.752-2." This formulation was
criticized on the grounds that excluding liabilities that are recourse to another partner was inconsistent with the
stated rationale of the rule that a partner's share of overall partnership profits is a better measure of who really bears
the burden of repayment of the debt and also because it gave rise to problems if the contributor and another partner
both guaranteed the relevant liability. See Amy S. Elliott, Treaswy to Clarify Tempormy Disguised Sale
Regulations, 2016 TNT 208-1 (Oct. 27, 2016). A "technical correction" to the Code Sec. 752 Limitation was issued
to address the latter concern, but not the former.
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including this newly incurred liability. Assume C's share of
partnership profits is 10%. C's share of the newly incurred liability
under Code Sec. 752 and the regulations thereunder is $0.
Therefore, C's share of the liability for disguised sale purposes is
$0 as a result of the Code Sec. 752 Limitation. Accordingly, C
receives the $50 of taxable consideration as part of a disguised sale
ofXtoAB.
b.

Example 14. C transfers property X, with a fair market value of
$100, to partnership AB. Immediately after the transfer, AB
encumbers X with a $50 liability and distributes the proceeds of
the borrowing to C. A guarantees all the liabilities of AB,
including this newly incurred liability. C indemnifies A for the first
$5 that A would have to pay under its guarantee of the newly
incurred liability. Assume C's share ofpatinership profits is 10%.
C' s share of the newly incurred liability under Code Sec. 752 and
the regulations thereunder is $5. Therefore, C's share of the
liability for disguised sale purposes is $5 because the Code Sec.
752 Limitation does not result in a lower share than C's share of
the liability based on C' s share of pminership profits. Accordingly,
C receives the $45 of taxable consideration as part of a disguised
sale of X to AB.
1.

11.

c.
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The result in Example 5 would be the same even if C
indemnified A for the entire $50 ofthe newly incurred
liability. That is, the Code Sec. 752 Limitation does not
lead to a larger share of a partnership liability than the
amount based on a pa1iner's share of partnership profits.
It is unclear whether the Code Sec. 752 Limitation takes
into account the patiners' shares of a partnership
nomecourse liability under tier one and tier two of the
allocation rules for nomecourse liabilities. It is difficult to
grasp a rationale for why tier one and tier two would be
relevant to the Code Sec. 752 Limitation, although the
Code Sec. 752 Limitation, read literally, does not exclude
tier one and tier two. A Treasury official has indicated that
tier one and tier two are not intended to be included in the
Code Sec. 752 Limitation. 62

Example 15. A transfers property X, with a fair market value of
$100 and basis of $0, to patinership AB. B transfers $5 of cash to
AB. Immediately after the transfers, AB encumbers X with a
liability of $90 and distributes the proceeds of the borrowing to A.

Amy S. Elliot, Clarification to Disguised Sale Rules Causing Confusion, 2016 TNT 228-2 (Nov. 28, 2016).

44

B guarantees the top $45 of the liability so that only B bears the
economic risk ofloss for that portion of the liability. Assume A's
share of AB's profits is 66.66%, which would result in a $60 share
ofthe liability but for the Code Sec. 752 Limitation. A's share of
the liability under Code Sec. 752, taking into account only the
General Rule for excess nonrecourse liabilities, is $30 (i.e., 2/3 x
$45 nonguaranteed portion of the debt). A's share of the liability
under Code Sec. 752, taking into account tier two, is $45.
1.

E.

It is unclear under the Code Sec. 752 Limitation whether
A's share of the liability for disguised sale purposes is
limited to $30 or $45.

CONCLUSION
1.

2.

We agree that the prior disguised sale rules were overly generous in
allowing taxpayers to use leverage to extract equity from property
transferred to a partnership while shifting the burden of repaying the debt
to other partners.
a.

Nevertheless, the Conference Report described a "borrowing
through the partnership" exception, and the Temporary Code Sec.
707 Regulation does not attempt to preserve that exception at all.
The "borrowing through the partnership" exception described in
the Conference Report involved a situation in which only
contributed property is encumbered by a liability (and, presumably,
other partnership property does not secure the liability) and the
contributing partner bears the risk of loss with respect to the
liability.

b.

In that situation, it appears that the contributing partner is
effectively extracting equity from its contributed property that it
could have extracted from the property by borrowing outside the
partnership.

c.

While the prior disguised sale rules on this point were overly
generous, arguably a "borrowing through the partnership"
exception should have been preserved where the liability was
secured only by the contributed property, consistent with the
direction of the Conference Report.

The new rule was a significant departure from the approach of the 2014
Proposed Regulations. Because the rule was issued as a temporary and not
a proposed regulation, taxpayers were denied the opportunity to provide
comments on the rule before it became effective.
a.

In light of the fact that leveraged partnerships had been a feature of
the tax law known to the government for many years, the issuance
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of the regulation in temporary form cannot be justified on grounds
of eliminating some new abuse.

3.

b.

Moreover, the temporary regulation as originally promulgated was
the subject of a prompt "technical conection" relating to the Code.
Sec. 752 Limitation.

c.

Further, as discussed above, the language of the conected Code
Sec. 752 Limitation is still arguably defective, which reinforces the
conclusion that the regulation should have been issued in proposed
rather than temporary fmm.

Executive Order 13789 and Subsequent Developments:
a.

As noted above, in Executive Order 13789, the Secretary of the
Treasury was directed to immediately review all significant tax
regulations issued on or after January 1, 2016, and submit a report
identifying regulations that (i) impose an undue fmancial burden
on U.S. taxpayers; (ii) add undue complexity to the Federal tax
laws; or (iii) exceed the statutory authority ofthe IRS.

b.

The IRS and Treasury issued Notice 2017-3 8, identifying
regulations as either imposing an undue fmancial burden on
taxpayers or adding undue complexity to the Code, and the Notice
included the temporary Section 707 regulations, regarding the
allocation of liabilities for purposes of the disguised sale mles.

c.

In its "Second Report to the President on Identifying and Reducing

Tax Regulatory Burdens," the Treasury indicated it is considering
whether the temporary Section 707 regulations should be revoked,
with the prior regulations reinstated ..
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